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V. CRIMINAL LAW AND EVIDENCE
A. "No-knock"Entries
At common law, law enforcement officers were permitted to
break open the door of a person's home if the officers first an-
nounced their presence and authority.' Until 1995, the United
States Supreme Court had never decided whether this knock-and-
announce principle was an element of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2
In Wilson v. Arkansas,3 the Supreme Court held that "in some cir-
cumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."4  However, the
Court specifically noted that "law enforcement interests may also
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry."5 The
Court left "to the lower courts the task of determining the circum-
stances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment."6 Since Wilson, the Court has twice revis-
ited the issue to establish the standard of the "no knock" entry ex-
ception.
In Richards v. Wisconsin,7 the Supreme Court announced the
rule that "no-knock" entries are justified when police officers have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
before entering would be dangerous or futile, or inhibit the inves-
8tigation of the crime. Based on substantial evidence that defen-
dant Steiney Richards was dealing drugs out of a hotel room, the
police requested a search warrant authorizing a "no-knock" entry
1. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
2. See id. at 934. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[tihe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
4. Id. at 934.
5. Id. at 936.
6. Id.
7. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
8. See id. at 394.
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into Richards' hotel room.9 The magistrate judge issued a search
warrant, but deleted the portions of the warrant that would have
authorized a "no-knock" entry.' ° Several officers arrived at the ho-
tel-one dressed as a maintenance worker, several in plain clothes,
and at least one in uniform. Officer Pharo, dressed in a mainte-
nance worker's uniform, knocked on Richards' door. 2 Richards
opened the door and noticed the uniformed officer standing be-
hind Officer Pharo.'3 Richards slammed the door shut.'4 The offi-
cers then kicked the door in and found Richards trying to climb
out the window.1 5 They seized cash and cocaine hidden above the
bathroom ceiling tiles. The officers testified at trial that as they
were kicking the door in, they identified themselves as police offi-
17
cers.
Richards moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search, arguing that the officers did not knock or identify them-
selves before forcing their way into the hotel room.18 The trial
court denied the motion, finding that the officers could have in-
ferred from Richards' behavior that he knew they were police offi-
cers and might attempt to escape or destroy the evidence, particu-
larly in light of the easily disposable nature of the drugs.' 9 On
appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that Wison did not
prohibit applying a blanket rule to a category of searches. ° The
court determined that all felony drug crimes will involve "an ex-
tremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well
as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to
entry by the police.",21 The court stated that "[t]he very facts sup-
porting probable cause to believe that drugs and drug dealers are
present in a dwelling also lead to the reasonable belief that exigent
circumstances exist."22 The court concluded that "exigent circum-






15. See id. at 388-89.
16. See id. at 389.
17. See id. at 388.
18. See id. at 389.
19. See id.
20. See State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Wis. 1996).
21. Id. at 219.
22. Id. at 222.
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stances are always present when a search warrant for evidence of fe-
lonious drug delivery is executed., 2' Therefore, when executing a
search warrant in felony drug cases, police are never required to
knock or announce their presence.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this approach, stating that
"[i] f a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal
investigation that included a considerable-albeit hypothetical-
risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-
announce element of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness re-. • 25
quirement would be meaningless. The Court stated that al-
though felony drug investigations may often present circumstances
warranting a "no-knock" entry, the trial court must determine on a
case-by-case basis "whether the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular entryjustified dispensing with the knock-and-announce re-
quirement."2 The Court held:
In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must
have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announc-
ing their presence, under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would be inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, al-
27lowing the destruction of evidence.
The Court reasoned that this standard strikes the appropriate
balance between legitimate law enforcement concerns and the in-
dividual's privacy interests. Applying this rule, the Court con-
cluded that Richards' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
by the "no-knock" entry.29
In United States v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court held that when
a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property, the
Fourth Amendment imposes no higher standard than that in Ri-
chards. In Ramirez, a confidential reliable informant reported to a
federal agent that he had seen a person at Hernan Ramirez's home
23. Id.
24. See id. at 227.




29. See id. at 395.
30. 118 S. Ct. 992 (1998).
31. See id. at 995.
1999] 1079
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who the informant believed to be escaped prisoner Alan Shelby.
Shelby had a history of violent behavior and was believed to have
had access to large supplies of weapons." The agent drove to Ra-
mirez's home and observed a man working outside who resembled
Shelby.
3 4
A U.S. Deputy Marshal obtained a "no-knock" warrant author-
izing law enforcement officers to enter and search Ramirez's
home.35 The warrant was executed in the early morning, while
36Ramirez and his family were sleeping inside the house. The offi-
cers announced over a loudspeaker that they had a search war-37
rant. At the same time, the officers broke a window in the garage
and pointed a gun through the opening in an attempt to discour-
age any occupant from trying to retrieve weapons which the officers
believed might be stored in the garage. Ramirez and his family
were awakened by the noise.39 Believing that his home was being
burglarized, Ramirez got a pistol and fired it into the ceiling of his
garage. Once Ramirez realized that it was law enforcement offi-
cers who were trying to enter his house, he surrendered. While in
custody, Ramirez admitted that he was the owner of the gun, that
he had fired the gun, and that he was a convicted felon.42
Ramirez was indicted for possession of firearms after a felonyS • 43
conviction. Ramirez moved for suppression of evidence regarding
his possession of the weapons." The trial court granted the motion
32. See id.
33. See id. This was Shelby's third attempt to escape from police custody:
In 1991, [Shelby] struck an officer kicked out a jail door, assaulted a
woman, stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle. Another
time he attempted escape by using a rope made from torn bedsheets. He
was reported to have made threats to kill witnesses and police officers, to
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and ruled that Ramirez's rights under both the Fourth Amendment
and a federal statute45 had been violated because there were "insuf-
ficient exigent circumstances" to warrant the destruction of prop-
erty.4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The court stated that although a "mild exigency" is sufficient tojus-
tify a "no-knock" entry, "more specific inferences of exigency are
necessary" when the "no-knock" entry results in property damage.4
The court held that the circumstances of this case did not satisfy
the heightened standard. 49
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision The
Court held that the "reasonable suspicion" standard articulated in
Richards "depends in no way on whether police must destroy prop-
erty in order to enter." 51 The Court noted the distinction between
the lawfulness of the entry itself and the lawfulness of the manner
52in which the search warrant is executed. The Court stated that
" [e] xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of
a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the en-
try itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppres-
sion.",5 The Court found that in this case, the police had a reason-
able suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence might
be dangerous based on their knowledge that "Shelby was a prison
escapee with a violent past who reportedly had access to a large
supply of weapons."54 The Court also concluded that the breaking
of the window was clearly reasonable under the circumstances and
did not violate Ramirez's Fourth Amendment rights.5
Ramirez also argued that breaking his window during the exe-
cution of the search warrant constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 3109.56 This provision states:
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994) (providing for forced entry under certain cir-
cumstances).
46. Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 996.
47. SeeUnited States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996).
48. Id. at 1301.
49. See id.
50. See Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 998.
51. Id. at 996.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 997. The Court also based this conclusion on the report of the reli-
able confidential informant, the police officer's confirmation of the informant's
allegations, and the fact that Shelby previously stated that he would "not do fed-
eral time." Id. at 996-97.
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The officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything
therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the
execution of the warrant.57
Ramirez argued that this statute prohibits property-damaging
entries under any circumstance other than those expressly pro-
58vided for in the statute. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the statute merely authorizes law enforcement officers to dam-.59
age property in certain instances. The Court reasoned that sec-
tion 3109 is a codification of the common law "knock and an-
nounce" requirement, including the exceptions to the
requirement. Applying the reasoning in Wilson and Richards, the
Court held that "[section] 3109 includes an exigent circumstances
exception and that the exception's applicability in a given instance
is measured by the same standard[] articulated in Richards."6' Ap-
plying the Richards standard, the Court concluded that the police
did not violate 18 U.S.C. section 3109.62
B. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Cases
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, and with it, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415. Rule 413 provides: "In a criminal case in which the de-
fendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant."64 Rule 414 similarly provides that in
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994).
58. See Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 997.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 997-98.
62. See id. at 998.
63. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994).
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criminal child molestation cases, "evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant."65 Rule 415 authorizes the use of such evidenceS 66
in civil cases concerning sexual assault or child molestation. In
four recent cases, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
61the application of Rules 413 and 414 in criminal cases.
In United States v. Sumnery the court held that Rule 414 is sub-
ject to the Rule 40369 balancing test.70 Sumner was convicted of ag-
gravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual conduct for having
71touched the genitals of D.D. on two separate occasions. On a
third occasion, Sumner had D.D. touch his genitals.7 ' At trial, un-
der Rule 404(b),73 the district court admitted evidence of two prior
incidents in which Sumner had sexually assaulted girls under four-
74teen years of age. The court of appeals held that the evidence was
In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this
rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the
defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the sub-
stance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days
before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may
allow for good cause.
FED. R. EVID. 413(b).
65. FED. R. EVID. 414(a). Rule 414(a) is subject to the same notice require-
ments as Rule 413. See FED. R. EVID. 414(b).
66. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a). Rule 415(b) imposes a fifteen-day notice re-
quirement on the party intending to offer the evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 415(b);
see also FED. R. EVID. 413 (mandating notice in criminal sexual assault cases).
67. See infra notes 68-141 and accompanying text.
68. 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
69. Rule 403 states that " [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EviD. 403.
70. See Sumner, 119 F.3d at 662; FED. R. EVID. 403 & 414.
71. See id. at 659-60.
72. See id. at 660.
73. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
74. See Sumner, 119 F.3d at 660.
1999] 1083
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not admissible under Rule 404(b) because the evidence showed
only that "Sumner has 'a propensity to commit crimes, which Rule
404(b) prohibits."' 75
The government argued that the evidence should have been76
admitted under Rule 414. The district court refused to admit the
evidence under Rule 414, finding that "the rule is unconstitutional
because it allows 'any kind of evidence to show propensity' without
allowing for the application of the Rule 403 balancing test." The
district court also stated that applying the Rule 403 balancing test
to Rule 404 was contrary to Congress' intent.
7
8
The court of agpeals ruled that Rule 414 is subject to the Rule
403 balancing test. The court reasoned that the language in Rule
414 is the same as language used in other rules which are subject to
the Rule 403 balancing test8 and that "nothing in the language of
Rule 414 precludes the application of Rule 403. "1 The court also
found that the legislative history clearly indicated that Rule 403 was• 82
intended to apply. One of the principal congressional sponsors of
the Rule stated, "In other respects, the general standards of the
rules of evidence will continue to apply, including the restrictions
on hearsay evidence and the court's authority under Evidence Rule
403 to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect." 3 Another sponsor stated:
The practical effect of the new rules is to put evidence of
uncharged offenses in sexual assault and child molesta-
tion cases on the same footing as other types of relevant
evidence that are not subject to a special exclusionary
rule. The underlying legislative judgment is that the evi-
dence admissible pursuant to the new rules is typically
relevant and probative, and any probative value is nor-
mally not outweighed by the risk of prejudicial or other
adverse effects.8
75. Id. at 660-61 (quoting United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 278 (8th
Cir. 1996)).
76. See id. at 661.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 661-62.
80. See id. (citing Rules 402 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
81. Id. at 662.
82. See id.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. (quoting 140 CONG. REc. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement
1084 [Vol. 25
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The court advised that if the government offers this evidence
on retrial, it is the district court's responsibility to conduct a Rule
85
403 balancing test.a 8
In United States v. LeComptes6 the Eighth Circuit held that "Rule
403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended effect."87 Le-
Compte was charged under 18 U.S.C. sections 2244(a) (1) and
2246(3) for the alleged sexual abuse of C.D., his wife's eleven-year-
old niece.88 On at least one occasion, LeCompte allegedly exposed
himself to C.D. while they played games together at her aunt's
trailer.8 On another occasion, LeCompte allegedly joined C.D. on
the couch, forced her to touch his penis, and touched her breasts
while C.D.'s siblings were sleeping on the floor next to her.90 Be-
fore trial, the government provided LeCompte with notice that it
intended to offer evidence under Rule 414 of prior uncharged sex
offenses against T.T., another niece of his by marriage. 9' The inci-
dents involving T.T. allegedly occurred eight to ten years prior to
the incidents with C.D.9 r T.T. was prepared to testify at trial that
"LeCompte had played games with her at her aunt's house, had
exposed himself to her, had forced her to touch his penis, and had
touched her private parts."9 3
LeCompte moved to exclude the evidence.94 After applying
the Rule 403 balancing test, the district court ruled that the evi-
dence was inadmissible because the potential for unfair prejudice
of Rep. Molinari)).
85. See id.
86. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997). This decision was based on LeCompte's
second trial. See id. at 768. In his first trial, the government failed to provide Le-
Compte with timely notice of its intent to introduce evidence of prior similar acts,
as required by Rule 414. See United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 276 (8th Cir.
1996). The district court admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b). See id. at 277.
In its first decision, the court of appeals ruled that the evidence was inadmissible
under Rule 404(b) and ordered a new trial. See id. at 279. On remand, the gov-
ernment provided timely notice and the evidence was admitted under Rule 414.
See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 768. The court noted that its prior ruling that the evi-
dence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) did not bar consideration of admissibil-
ity under Rule 414 on retrial. See id. at 769.
87. LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769.
88. See id. at 768. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a) (1) and 2246(3) (1994).
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S 95outweighed the limited probative value of the evidence. The dis-. • 96
trict court recognized similarities between the incidents, but
found that the probative value was limited by several differences.97
The district court also found significant the eight year period sepa-
rating the incidents.98 The court stated, "T.T.'s testimony is obvi-
ously highly prejudicial evidence against defendant. ... '[C]hild
sexual abuse deservedly carries a unique stigma in our society; such
highly prejudicial evidence should therefore carry a very high de-
gree of probative value if it is to be admitted.' -9
The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis. 00 The
court stated that although Rule 414 is subject to the requirements
of Rule 403,1 it must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended ef-
fect, namely to supersede the restrictive aspects of Rule 404(b) .
The court ruled, "In light of the strong legislative judgment that
evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible,
we think the District Court erred in its assessment that the proba-
tive value of T.T.'s testimony was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. 03 The court found that the offenses
committed against the two girls were substantially similar and that
the differences were small. The court stated that even the district
court acknowledged that the eight year period between the of-
fenses "'may not be as significant as it appears at first glance be-
cause defendant was imprisoned for a portion of the time between
[the offenses] which deprived defendant of the opportunity to
abuse any children.",
0 5
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's emphasis
on the "unique stigma" of child sexual abuse-the danger that the
95. See id. at 769.
96. See id. ("IT] hey were both young nieces of LeCompte at the time he mo-
lested them, he forced them both to touch him, he touched them both in similar
places, and he exposed himself to both of them.").
97. See id. The differences were that "the acts allegedly committed against
C.D. occurred with her siblings present, while the acts against T.T. occurred in iso-
lation" and that "LeCompte had not played games with C.D. immediately before
molesting her, as he had with T.T." Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. (quoting District Court Order at 4) (citation omitted in original).
100. See id.
101. See id.




105. Id. at 769-70 (quoting District Court Order at 4).
1086 [Vol. 25
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jury might convict based on LeCompte's propensity to commit
child sexual abuse, rather than on the facts directly supporting the
offense against C.D. °6 The court concluded that "[i]t is for this
reason that the evidence was previously excluded, and it is precisely
such holdings that Congress intended to overrule."0 7
In United States v. Eagle,"8 Eagle sexually abused K.W., the niece
of his common law wife, while K.W. was visiting their home.1°9 Ea-
gle told K.W. to lie on the bed beside him, and then touched her
vagina several times.'10  Eagle also attempted to take off K.W.'s
clothing."' At trial, the government sought to introduce evidence
that Eagle had pleaded guilty ten years earlier to a federal crime in-
volving sexual abuse of a minor. The minor in that case was
K.W.'s aunt, who was fourteen at the time of the offense. 1" The
trial court admitted the evidence under Rules 413 and 414.114
On appeal, Eagle argued that the probative value was minimal
because of the ten-year separation between the offenses and be-
cause the victim in the first case later became his common law
wife. 115 The court of appeals rejected both arguments. The court
reasoned that the fact that the first victim was Eagle's common law
wife gave the jury the opportunity to discount the prejudice the in-
formation might otherwise have caused."' The court also noted
that the ten-year separation between the offenses was less signifi-
cant than it might appear because Eagle was incarcerated for six of
the ten years.
Eagle also argued that LeCompte requires that evidence offered
under Rule 414 must also comply with Rule 404. 19 The court re-
jected this argument, stating that "[i]n LeCompte the court analyzed
evidence of prior acts of child sexual assaults by the defendant un-
106. Id. at 770 (noting that "[t]his danger is one that all propensity evidence in
such trials presents").
107. Id.
108. 137 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 1998).
109. Id. at 1012.
110. See id. at 1012-13.
111. Seeid. at1013.
112. See id. at 1013, 1015-16; FED. R. EvID. 413& 414.
113. SeeEagle, 137 F.3d at 1016.
114. See id. at 1015-16.
115. Seeid. at 1016.
116. See id. (noting that the district court properly conducted a balancing test
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
1999] 1087
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der Rule 404 because the government had failed to file a timely
Rule 414 motion, not because such evidence is only admissible if it
fulfills the requirements under both rules."20 The court pointed
out that on remand, the same evidence was held admissible under
Rule 414 where the government complied with the notice require-
ments.'2' The court concluded that the evidence of Eagle's prior
offense against K.W.'s aunt was admissible.
12
In United States v. Mound, 12 the Eighth Circuit held that Rule
413 does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution. 12 4 Mound was convicted of seven counts aris-
ing out of multiple acts of physical and sexual abuse of his daugh-
125ter that occurred between 1993 and 1997. At trial, the govern-
ment sought to introduce evidence of two incidents occurring in
1987 in which Mound sexually abused two girls.126 Mound pled
guilty to one offense and government dropped the investigation on
the other incident.127 The district court conducted a Rule 403 bal-
ancing test and concluded that evidence of the prior act that did. .. . . 128
not result in prosecution or conviction was inadmissible. The dis-
trict court stated that "while I find that this evidence is relevant, I
find that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. And I further find that it would simply
confuse the issues in this case, none of which are similar to the case
of the witness." 2 9 However, the district court found that evidence
of the prior conviction presented no similar concerns and admitted
the evidence after giving a cautionary instruction to the jury.'3
On appeal, Mound argued that Rule 413 violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it "authorizes the jury
to overvalue character evidence, to punish a defendant for past acts
and to convict the defendant for who he is, rather than for what he
120. Eagle, 137 F.3d at 1016 (citing United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274,
274 (8th Cir. 1996)).
121. See id. (citing United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768-69 (8th Cir.
1997)).
122. See id.
123. 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 842 (1999).
124. Id. at 801; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V. and XIV.
125. See Mound, 149 F.3d at 800.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 801.
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has done.""'1 The court of appeals considered whether "the intro-
duction of this type of evidence is so extremely unfair that its ad-
mission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.""2 The court
followed the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, which reviewed a similar case' and held that "it was within
Congress's power to create exceptions to the longstanding practice
of excluding prior-bad-acts-evidence.
The court of appeals also rejected Mound's argument that
Rule 413 violates the Equal Protection Clause.1 5 The court cited
two distinctive characteristics of sexual abuse cases which Congress
used to justify the use of prior-bad-acts evidence in these cases:
"[T] he reliance of sex offense cases on difficult credibility determi-
nations that 'would otherwise become unresolvable swearing
matches"' and, "in the case of child sexual abuse, the 'exceptionally
probative' value of a defendant's sexual interest in children."1s6
The court held that "[p1romoting the effective prosecution of sex
offenses is a legitimate end" and that "Congress's judgment in en-
acting Rules 413, 414, and 415, was rational."
The court held that the district court did not err by admitting
the evidence of Mound's prior conviction. "8 The court stated that
"[t]here is no evidence that the prior conviction presented any
danger of unfair prejudice beyond that which 'all propensity evi-
131. Id. at 801 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 24).
132. Id. (applying the due process test of fundamental fairness) (quoting
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (further citation omitted).
133. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998). In Enjady, the
Tenth Circuit stated:
One reason the majority in Spencer gave for upholding the validity of the
Texas statutes was that "it has never been thought that [the Court's Due
Process Clause fundamental fairness] cases establish this Court as a rule-
making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure."
Rule 413 is a federal rule, of course, and most federal procedural rules
are promulgated under the auspices of the Supreme Court and the Rules
Enabling Act. But we must recognize that Congress has the ultimate
power over the enactment of rules, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074, which it exer-
cised here.
Id. at 1432 (discussing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)).
134. Mound, 149 F.3d at 801.
135. See id.
136. Id. (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (state-
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The court also noted that the district court's cautionary statement
to the jury provided an additional safeguard against unfair preju-
dice.' 4 The court concluded that the district court did not err in
admitting under Rule 413 evidence that would be inadmissible un-
der Rule 404(b) because it was Congress's intent that Rule 413 su-
percede the restrictive aspects of Rule 404(b) .41
Cynthia K Schneider
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